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Abstract 
This thesis asks if and how the defense contractor can profitably transfer the technology 
and institutional learning obtained from DoD funded R&D to commercial markets.  
There are numerous examples of very successful defense conversion in U.S. history, 
such as the computer and internet. This phenomenon however, is not commonplace and 
the original developer of the military applied technology did not often profit from its 
commercialization.  Faced with multiple disadvantages associated with having adapted 
to doing business with the DoD, this thesis hypothesizes that the one possible advantage 
that the DoD contractor has in competing in the commercial markets is access to 
advanced technological knowledge and personnel that have benefited from the learning 
associated from performing state of the art R&D for the DoD. This degree of advanced 
technology learning is not as accessible to the commercial firm because business 
pressures do not allow the degree of funding for cutting edge technology and less 
directly applicable research.  This thesis examines the barriers for the DoD contractor 
attempting to move into the commercial market and examines cases studies of 
successful conversions and the recommendations from applicable prescriptive 
literature. 
Thesis Supervisor: Donna Rhodes 
Title: Senior Lecturer, Engineering Systems Division   
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1 Introduction 
1.1 Motivation 
1.1.1 Untapped Potential of Defense Research and Development   
A great deal of money, time, and effort has been expended to develop science and 
technology for defense applications.  Since 1976 the U.S. government has spent $2,358 
trillion 2011 USD for defense research and development (AAAS, 2012).  Most of this 
spending originates from the U.S. Department of Defense, or DoD. This is spending 
aside from the very high cost of actually operating the military in times of war and 
peace.   
There is no question that the commercial sector and most of us as individuals living 
today have benefitted from the U.S.’s Department of Defense’s funding for the 
development of technologies, such as the computer and the internet for example.  On 
the one hand, given the high risk, high funding outlay and fundamental research that 
were necessary to develop these breakout technologies, it is hard to imagine anything 
but federal funding could have made these technologies possible.  On the other hand, in 
terms of percentages, high impact technology transfers such as these are evaluated to be 
a very small fraction of the research and development activities funded by the U.S. 
Department of Defense (DoD)(Mowery, 2010). 
 Successes such as digital computing and the internet are termed “serendipitous” in that 
these projects were not originally developed for the reason of providing non-military 
benefit to society at large. A confluence of unplanned events led to these successes and 
the factors leading to these successes were only recognized in retrospect (White et al., 
1996).  This rarity of successful transfer to the civilian sector is not too surprising in that 
U.S. defense R&D is “mission-oriented,” in that its purpose is not to provide technology 
for the commercial realm, but to provide technology that will support the long term 
military strategy of the United States (Kelley, 1999).  Throughout most of the Defense 
Industry’s history, there has been little incentive to transfer technology to the civilian 
sector.  However, there have been periods of time, such as in the mid-1990’s, when the 
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defense industry faced a serious downturn after the end of the Cold War (see Figure 1-1 
and Figure 1-2) and contractors were motivated to switch to commercial and other 
sources of income.   Also, during the Clinton administration under the Technology 
Reinvestment Project (TRP) federal funding of DoD R&D switched to the concept of 
dual-use, or the intentional development of technologies and systems to have both 
civilian and defense applications.  However, these efforts also did not show a high-level 
of success  (Gansler, 2011; Kelley, 1997; White et al., 1996).  This suggests that 
transferring military technology and knowledge to commercial applications is not a 
trivial matter and deserves study. 
The commercial sector could benefit from not only the developed technology, but also 
from the expertise of those personnel that have generated the technology in the first 
place.  In some sense this does happen to a small extent now in that engineers and 
scientists moving from defense to commercial companies do bring experience and skills 
developed from defense funded advanced technology development with them to their 
new commercially applied work (Alic, Carter, Branscomb, & Epstein, 1992). However, 
this benefit is quite indirect, and part of the value inherent in development of a 
technology or system is the existence of teams with complementary skills and 
knowledge, much of it tacit (Alic et al., 1992). It would be a much more direct and 
efficient means to utilize the knowledge and skills developed from DoD funded R&D if it 
were to be used in the same context and groups of people who originated the technology.  
The organization originating the technology may not be the same one that utilizes the 
technology at maturity, but it will be argued that the best way to bring a product or 
service to maturity will make use of the tacit knowledge available that would probably be 
missed or have to be rediscovered by a new team (Alic et al., 1992).  It is the intent of 
this thesis to examine how an existing organization having originally developed 
technical expertise for the development of a military application can transfer these 
developed skills, develop related technologies for non-military applications and 
successfully sell them in new markets. 
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1.1.2 Instability of the U.S. Defense Contracting Market 
There is a great deal of concern that the funding supporting the defense contracting 
industry will shrink in the future (Barnes, Entous, & Hodge, 2102).   History shows that 
the U.S. Defense R&D budget is erratic and subject to political winds.  Figure 1-1 shows 
the total U.S. Defense R&D spending normalized to the U.S. GDP from 1976 to 2012 and 
Figure 1-2 is the annual growth of the Defense R&D in terms of constant 2011 US 
Dollars and in terms of fraction of U.S. GDP that was obtained from data provided by 
the American Association for the Advancement of Science (AAAS, 2012). These curves 
show that there are multiple periods in the period spanning from 1976 to 2012 in which 
there is negative growth.  The most mature and stagnant industry will be expected to at 
least grow with the overall economy.  When the budget is normalized to the U.S. GDP, 
the defense spending growth is even less favorable because the overall growth of the 
U.S. economy is being taken into account.   
Defense contracting companies and their employees are interested in diversifying their 
funding such that it does not solely consist of U.S. government and defense sources.   
Some U.S. defense contractors have moved into domestic state and local government 
and foreign military markets as a way of adapting to the instability of the U.S. military 
R&D funding (Jacobs & Shalal-Esa, 2012). The option considered in this thesis is the 
option of entering the commercial market.  Any means to keep military contractors 
financially viable also has the benefit to the DoD in that when the world changes and 
their needs in a particular technology area become acute, the expertise that they 
previously funded and utilized will be available for them within a functioning business 
entity. 
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Figure 1-1. AAAS data on historical U.S. Spending for Defense Applications 
as a Fraction of U.S. GDP1. 
 
 
Figure 1-2. Year to year growth from AAAS historical U.S. spending for 
defense applications in 2011 USD1.  
                                                   
1 Source: data table from AAAS Research and Development series. FY 2012 data tables  (AAAS, 2012) 
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1.2 Research Objectives and Approach 
The most fundamental question that this thesis hopes to address is under what 
conditions defense contractors can adapt the technical skills within their organizations 
to successfully enter the commercial market.  The objective of this thesis is to provide an 
overall system level view that would be helpful to a U.S. defense contractor that would 
like to adapt their existing skill set and technologies to the commercial market.   
The following hypotheses will be tested: 
• The internal organizational management and culture borne of the incentives of 
the defense marketplace are obstacles to the defense contractors’ commercial 
success. 
• Marketing to the commercial customer will be very challenging for the defense 
contractor. 
• The defense contractor is the beneficiary of organizational learning obtained 
from the experience of performing research and development on advanced areas 
that would not be funded in the commercial realm.   
• The defense contractor’s learning derived from defense R&D experience can be 
turned into a competitive advantage in some cases. 
These hypotheses will be evaluated by a study of the literature, some numerical and 
statistical data, and in the context of a real-world case study. 
1.3 Scope of Thesis 
In the most general sense, the topic of this thesis, “how can defense contractors move to 
the commercial realm”, involves understanding the very large and very complex system 
in which the highly variable defense contractor and commercial market place resides.  
The fate of a defense contractor is tied to international events, politics and economics to 
some extent.  Perhaps more directly the defense contractor is influenced by decisions 
and government policy that is a reaction to international events and national politics.  
Additionally there are many types of defense contractors that work in different 
technology areas, types of research, and scales of system development.  The commercial 
market is likewise widely influenced in a global economy and spans a great variety of 
technologies.  To be most congruent with the case study that is featured in this thesis, 
the scope will be narrowed to be most pertinent to the case of a U.S. defense contractor 
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that fulfills engineering services to a new commercial customer within a particular 
subset of the commercial market.  In this case it is a portion of a larger company that 
provides specialized services in design and evaluation of combat ship survivability that 
attempts to move software and expertise to the off shore drilling rig industry.  
The term “technology” is a term without a unique definition (Wahab, Rose, & Wati 
Osman, 2012). The term “technology” and “knowledge” will be used somewhat 
interchangeably in the thesis.  Technology and knowledge enable the creation of a 
product or service. In the context of this thesis, technology is embodied in the capability 
to predict survivability of specific designs of combat ships and offshore oil rigs.  
Technology underlies a particular product created for a particular application 
Figure 1-3 is a conceptual sketch of subject areas that will be covered in this thesis as 
they are interrelated and areas upon more attention will be covered.  U.S. politics 
undoubtedly has had a large influence on the history of federally funded research and 
development and U.S. Defense Policy.  These are factors, along with the Defense 
Acquisition process have shaped the internal structures and incentives of the defense 
contractor dependent upon them.  Much of the literature pertaining to defense 
technology transfer is centered on U.S. economic policy. All attempts will be made to 
resist the temptation to weigh in on what the federal government and policy makers 
should be doing and instead examine how the defense market has shaped the current 
state of most defense contractors.  
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Figure 1-3. A graphical representation of the various areas of discussion 
and the concentrated scope of analysis of this thesis. 
It must be acknowledged that in any case, bringing a product or service to any market, 
especially a new one is can be difficult for all enterprises, not just defense contractors.  
The research in this thesis will discuss some of these factors as they are generally 
relevant and those that are especially relevant to the engineering service organization 
that is studied in the case study.  
1.4 Organization of Thesis 
Section 2 is an overview of work related to the concept of technology transfer for 
military technology and provides a historical overview of the history of dual-use 
technology and research and development. In the spirit of Russell Ackoff’s “Design 
Thinking” (Ackoff, Magidson, & Addison, 2006) Sections 3 through 5 will cover in the 
context of defense conversions: 
i. What the current state or “mess” is for the defense contractor  
ii. Where the contractor wants to be in terms of commercialization 
Commercial Marketplace
Engineering 
Services 
Marketplace
U.S. 
Government 
Research 
Funding
U.S. Politics
U.S. Government
Defense Policy
Defense 
Acquisitions
New Market
(Offshore Petro.)
Concentrated 
Scope
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iii. What is required to meet the goal of commercialization  
 
Section 3 will discuss the strengths and weaknesses that the DoD contractor has in 
bringing a product or service to the commercial market. Section 4 reviews past 
documented successes of similar activity that have been obtained from the literature and 
discusses common elements in these cases.  Section 5 discusses prescriptive literature 
relevant to organizations that wish to move to new markets and how new markets for 
existing technologies can be developed. 
Section 6 will cover a case study of an ongoing effort in which a group that specialized in 
combat ship survivability is working to transfer this expertise and associated software 
package to the application of offshore drill rigs survivability and safety.  This section will 
consist of a description of the project and how the experience of the organization and 
individuals did or did not correlate well with the researcher’s own hypotheses and what 
a study of the literature has suggested. Information is gathered from personal interviews 
and related internal reports.  Section 7 will follow with overall conclusions and 
suggestions for areas of future work. 
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2 Background  
2.1 Literature Survey 
There is a wealth of literature concerned with the dichotomy of defense and commercial 
technology development.  Much of this work concerns the high cost and inefficiency of 
defense R&D.  The fact that commercial products are developed and manufactured for 
commercial markets at a fraction of the cost for similar products provided by defense 
contractors is studied in depth. In the academic literature, the contrast in commercial 
and defense oriented product and technology development is studied at a policy level, at 
the level of how the commercial practices can be adapted by the defense industry, and 
the history of how defense technology has been adapted to the commercial markets. 
Most of this work seems to at least weigh in on U.S. military acquisition and budgetary 
policy. Figure 2-1 is a conceptual sketch of the intersection and relationship of the 
subject matter that much of the literature discusses as important factors in the state of 
the typical defense contractor. 
 
Figure 2-1. Conceptual sketch of subject matter found in literature and the 
relationships with each subject. 
Commercial Firms
DoD  Contractors
U.S. 
Government 
Research 
Funding
U.S. Politics
U.S. Government
Defense Policy
Defense 
Acquisitions
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2.1.1 Investigations in Public Policy  
A significant body of work examines how U.S. government policies have created the 
current state of inefficient government spending on defense R&D and acquisition for the 
wrong technologies for today’s post-cold-war threats to the United States. These works 
analyze the interaction between the defense contractors, Congress, the government 
acquisition system and defense strategy and then discusses how government policy 
needs to be changed to adapt and create a better outcome (Ham & Mowery, 1995; 
Nanto, 2011; Schafer & Hyland, 1994; Trajtenberg, 2004) . While providing 
recommendations on public policy is outside the scope of this thesis, this work is 
relevant to this thesis in that it explains the system in which the defense contractor 
currently operates.  This system has shaped the strengths and weaknesses that the 
military contractor has in pursuing the strategy of converting defense technology to that 
for the commercial market. Policy work also offers an important perspective because it 
offers alternative explanations for previous poor performance for efficient technology 
transfer by DoD contractors other than the intrinsic and incurable unsuitability of DoD 
contractors for efficiently bringing products to market.  
Jacques Gansler is regarded as an authority on DoD acquisition and budget policy, 
having served as the Under Secretary of  Defense for Acquisition, Technology and 
Logistics from 1997-2001, teaching at the University of Maryland’s Center of Public 
Policy and Private Enterprise as well as being the author of  numerous books on the 
subject (“Jacques S. Gansler,” n.d.).  Gansler’s  Democracy’s Arsenal, published in 2011 
is a recent and comprehensive treatment of many of the issues surrounding what 
Gansler judges to be a dysfunctional system of defense contractors, Congress, and the 
Department of Defense, that is failing to adapt to a changing global economy and 
changing threats to the U.S.  He asserts that many of the problems facing the current 
system stem from a failure to change a system that was developed in the shadow of the 
cold war and the fact that the defense contractor is operating is economic environment 
created by a defense acquisition policy that is antithetical to the free-market and 
competition that would drive efficiency. The solution that Gansler offers is one of 
radically changing policy in defense acquisition and budgetary policy.   This work is very 
useful because it is an exhaustive analysis of the inner workings of the defense industry 
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and explains the practices and outcomes found in the commercial sector as a point of 
reference.  
John Alic is another authority on defense economics and policy and served as a staff 
member in the Congressional Office of Technology Assessment in the years 1979-1995. 
Alic’s 2007 book Trillions for Military Technology: How the Pentagon Innovates and 
Why It Costs So Much critically examines the system of military technology 
development of today. 
2.1.2 Commercial Best Practices and Technology for Defense 
Applications 
The best companies can develop products and processes for the commercial market at a 
fraction of the cost and time that defense contractors can. There has been a great deal of 
work in the policy and academic arenas related to determining how to transfer the best 
practices used by commercially oriented firms to defense applications. This work offers 
another perspective in analyzing the differences in the needs and practices for 
commercial and defense markets. In terms of top down policy studies and 
recommendations, the US GAO has issued number of  reports to the U.S. Congress that 
discuss these issues (United States Government Accountability Office, 2006; United 
States Government Acountability Office, 2005).  These reports describe the lack of 
commercial practices such as proper screening and stage gating of technologies for 
continued development for DoD projects. Another problem cited is the lack of 
accountability for products actually being transferred from the laboratory to the field by 
their developers, which is in contrast to that for the commercial organization.  In terms 
of a more specific application of commercial best practices to defense applications  
Davis, (Davis, 2007) examines how to stage gate R&D using defense related metrics 
such as Technology Readiness Levels (TRL) and Manufacturing Readiness Levels (MRL) 
for “go/kill” decisions. This study determined that the business case evaluations were 
missing from the existing DoD evaluation metrics and needed to be enacted. 
Other work considers the possibility of the U.S. military moving towards obtaining 
products and technology more directly from commercial industry as opposed to from 
traditional defense contractors. The advantages and disadvantages of Consumer off-the-
12 
 
shelf equipment for military applications is discussed in some practical literature 
(Barbarello, 2000).  The barriers toward actually implementing this option is discussed 
in a survey regarding the attitudes of commercial firms have towards sharing their 
technology with the DoD (Crawford & Botwin, 2004).  This survey indicates that 
commercial firms are hesitant to work with the military because of their perceptions of 
difficulties with intellectual property, acquisition and accounting requirements, and 
export control laws. 
2.1.3 Defense Conversion to Commercial Applications 
Of special interest is the body of work identified with the general subject identifier 
“defense conversion,” which is a general term describing the conversion of defense 
technology to civilian applications.   There is also work classified under “dual-use” 
technology development, defense “spinoffs”, or defense technology “spillover” that 
addresses the defense conversion in a number of specific contexts.  In the literature of 
interest to this thesis, the term “dual-use” refers to the situation in which products and 
processes are initially developed for both commercial and defense applications from the 
onset (White et al., 1996).  A “spinoff” is the purposeful conversion of defense 
technology to the commercial realm after it has been developed for the defense market  
(Alic et al., 1992; White et al., 1996). “Spillover” is a term that also includes the less 
direct benefit of civilian technology from original development of defense applied 
technology.  An example of a spillover effect is the ability of new technologies to be 
developed via the funding provided by the U.S. DoD in the role of acting as a paying 
customer.  The DoD was willing to pay prices over what would be commercially viable 
while the technology developer’s manufacturing processes were being developed so that 
the products could be competitively priced and sold at scale to the commercial markets.  
An often cited work on the subject of defense conversion is Alic’s book, Beyond Spinoff: 
military and commercial technologies in a changing world (Alic et al., 1992). This book 
compares and contrasts how technology is developed in commercial and defense 
contexts.  In addition it offers many specific case studies of successful and unsuccessful 
conversions of defense technology to commercial applications.  To distinguish the 
different modes of transition, the book (Alic et al., 1992) categorizes the modes of 
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defense conversion as is indicated in Table 2-1.  Alic also discusses public policy in the 
book as a possible cause and cure for the inefficiency of defense spending.  
Table 2-1 Types of Defense Conversion and Spillover (Alic et al., 1992) 
Term Description Example 
Dual-Use  
Purposeful development of products for both 
defense and commercial applications by 
contractors from outset 
Artificial Intelligence, 
General Basic Research 
Concurrent 
Development 
Purposeful and planned development of products 
for both defense and commercial applications by 
contractors with bifurcation of development paths 
for each application 
Jet Engine 
Spinoff 
Adaption of technology originally developed for 
defense applications for the commercial market. 
Microwave Oven 
Commercial 
Learning via 
Defense 
Procurement  
Defense procurement of product allows the 
company to learn and work on improving the 
product and manufacturing processes as long as it 
needed to allow the product to be suitable for the 
commercial market. This is an example of spillover 
in the terminology of some authors. 
Digital Computing 
Reverse Spinoff 
or “Spin-on” 
Defense uses product previously developed for 
commercial use;  provides additional market for 
industry 
Consumer off-the-shelf 
products (COTS), semi-
conductor 
Shared 
Infrastructure 
Commercial and defense industries can pool 
resources for development of supporting 
infrastructure for products and industry 
Launch Vehicles 
Forced 
Diffusion 
Purposeful diffusion instigated during the 
development of the product by defense transfer 
agencies 
VHSIC chip 
development technology 
program 
 
“Dual-Use” was a policy that peaked in the Clinton administration in the mid 1990’s, 
however there have been numerous attempts before and since to that attempted to 
encourage the transfer of defense technology for civilian benefit.  The Technology 
Reinvestment Program (TRP), enacted in the 1990’s hoped to encourage the defense 
and commercial industry to develop technology suitable for both the commercial and 
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defense needs. Part of the impetus of this was that the Cold War had ended and the 
defense needs for high technology had diminished, but needed to be maintained for 
future threats.   Academic interest in this subject peaked in the mid 1990’s as well 
assuming it is reflected in the number of references published at this time. Figure 2-2 is 
a plot of the frequency of publications from the Web of Science database with the term 
“dual-use” and “military” in the subject normalized by the total number of publications 
with the term “military” in the subject.  This plot indicates special interest in “military 
dual-use” peaking around the year 1997.  The database has publications dating back to 
1929, but no mention of “military dual use” appears in the database before 1989.  As a 
reference, Figure 2-3 is the graph of the number of publications with the term “military” 
in the subject field that was obtained from the Web of Science database, which is the 
normalizing factor for the plot in Figure 2-2. 
 
Figure 2-2. Number of Web of Science references with “dual use” and 
“military” in subject identifier normalized by the number of references with 
only “military” in the identifiers2 
                                                   
2 Obtained from Web of Science, accessed 4/17/2012 
http://thomsonreuters.com/products_services/science/science_products/a-z/web_of_science/ 
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Figure 2-3. Number of Web of Science references with “military” in subject 
identifiers2 
Some of the “dual-use” literature from the mid-1990’s is either a pessimistic or an 
optimistic prediction of the for the potential for a dual-use technology development 
funding policy (Becker, 1994; Brandt, 1994; Clark, 1994; McAuliffe, 1995; U S 
Department of Defense, 1995). This policy and the outcomes associated with it will be 
further discussed in Section 2.2.2.   
2.2 The Modern Defense Industry  
This section briefly describes the history of the modern defense industry to provide 
background and context for subsequent discussions of the current state of the typical 
defense contractor.   Observations and lessons learned from experiments in policies 
directed at dual use technology are also discussed in the context of the recent history of 
the defense industry in the United States. 
2.2.1 The Military Industrial Complex 
The U.S. “military industrial complex” as we know it today originated at the end of 
World War II.   This is a time in which defense R&D and procurement exploded and an 
entrenched industry that specialized in military research and development and the 
manufacture of armaments began to develop.  In 1940 military R&D consisted of $29.6 
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million (1930 USD) which was a minority share of 35% of the total federal R&D budget.  
By 1945 military R&D budget was $1.3 billion 1930 USD, (Mowery, 2010).  This 
spending reflects the costs of World War II (WWII) and the costs incurred by the 
Manhattan Project to develop the atomic bomb.   This period was an initial spike in the 
growth of defense spending that inaugurated an era that never returned to pre-WWII 
levels.  Figure 2-4 is plot of the total federal government defense spending (as opposed 
to only R&D spending which is indicated in Figure 1-1) on as a fraction of U.S. GDP. This 
plot shows the surge in spending and continued high levels (“Defense Spending In 20th 
Century United States 1902-2015 - Federal State Local Data,” 2012). Also superimposed 
on the plot in Figure 2-4 is the total spending in constant 2005 USD, obtained by 
multiplying fractional GDP data by the data obtained for the US GDP from the US 
Department Commerce (US Department of Commerce, 2012).  Looking at the total cost 
of defense spending in terms of the percentage of GDP in recent years does not provide 
as alarming a picture of runaway growth and oscillations of defense spending that 
looking at the data in terms of actual dollars does. 
 
Figure 2-4. Total US Defense Spending as % of US GDP and in 2005 USD3  
                                                   
3 Data obtained from usgovernmentpending.com (“Defense Spending In 20th Century United States 
1902-2015 - Federal State Local Data,” 2012) and bea.gov (US Department of Commerce, 2012) 
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The Department of Defense was created by the passage of the National Security Act of 
1947 (“Milestones: 1945-1952, National Security Act of 1947,” n.d.). Defense spending 
since has accounted for between 50% and 70% of all U.S. government R&D spending 
(Mowery, 2010).  This spending has supported commercial enterprises outside of the 
government in times of war and peace. The growth of this defense contracting industry  
started to  pick up again during the Korean war (1950-1953)  so did the divergence of the 
requirements of technology for commercial and military applications as the cold war 
continued and even after it ended (Alic, 2007; Nanto, 2011).    
The term “military industrial complex” was coined by Dwight Eisenhower in 1961 during 
his presidential farewell speech to express his concern that a system consisting of a 
political Congress that controlled defense spending, military contractors with strong 
financial interests and the military itself could exert undue influence on the nation and 
politics.  In this same speech Eisenhower stated (Nanto, 2011): 
Until the latest of our world conflicts, the United States had no armaments 
industry. American makers of plowshares could, with time and as required, 
make swords as well. But now we can no longer risk emergency improvisation 
of national defense; we have been compelled to create a permanent armaments 
industry of vast proportions. Added to this, three and a half million men and 
women are directly engaged in the defense establishment. We annually spend 
on military security more than the net income of all United States corporations. 
This quote reflects the enormity of the system in which the defense contractor works.  It 
doesn’t seem things have changed all that much except the share of the economy 
controlled by the industrial defense complex isn’t quite as large since the U.S. economy 
has grown. There have been great economic and political interests driving the behavior 
of this system for a very long time.  
The Cold War that was the apparent stimulus for the policy of large outlays in defense 
spending ended in late 1991 (“The End of the Cold War,” 2000).   The next section takes 
the history of the U.S. defense industry to the 1990’s and the attempts to promote dual 
use of defense technology now that the cold-war had ended and it was difficult to justify 
high levels of defense spending. 
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2.2.2 Dual-Use, Spill-over and Spin-offs in the 1990’s 
The 1990’s time period was when defense funding precipitously dropped (as shown in 
both Figure 1-2 and Figure 2-4).  As is the case today, this is a situation that should have 
inspired defense contractors to pursue other avenues of business, including intentional 
spinning-off of defense technology or technical knowledge to other markets.  The “dual-
use” policy enacted in the TRP program between 1993 and 1996 also spurred interest in 
defense conversion in general by starting to fund technology with both commercial and 
defense applications (Investing in Innovation: Creating a Research and Innovation 
Policy That Works, 1999). The results of this experiment are an interesting point of 
reference to answer the most fundamental question of: “Can purposeful development of 
commercial technology by defense contractor organizations be successful?”   
From the contractors’  and DoD’s points of view, the idea of dual-use technology 
development and spillover is a very appealing way to justify continued funding of the 
military-industrial complex.  The claim is made that with conventional defense spending 
that it is benefitting the civilian standard of living and overall economy of the United 
States, so defense spending is worth it, even in times of peace, given a the natural 
“spillover” effect.  However, studies to measure the extent of this spillover are somewhat 
ambiguous of the efficiency of research spending (Stowsky, 2004).  Admittedly, this 
would be somewhat difficult to measure objectively. Stowsky points out that part of the 
problem with DoD technology transfer is that the DoD has a long held instinct to keep 
technological developments secret in order to protect the military’s tactical advantage 
(Stowsky, 2004) and are not practiced at disseminating technology. 
The aims of the TRP program and dual-use defense spending were manifold.  
Proponents of the policy predicted that the policy would drive positive trends in U.S. 
commercial and defense industry (Stowsky, 1996) such as:  
• Advancement in  commercial technologies assuring a technology base for the 
military in times of need 
• An increase in commercial innovation in general 
• An increase in the competitive edge of U.S. industry in the global economy 
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• A means to help wean the defense industry off of the higher level of funding to 
which it has become accustomed 
• Help with transitioning the over-built defense industry to commercial markets 
Politically, the TRP policy was controversial and was fiercely opposed by factions of the 
Republican Party, rival to the Democratic Administration enacting the policy 
(McAuliffe, 1995).  Conservative think tank, the Cato Institute, did not like the policy 
because it smacked of corporate welfare (Moore & Stansel, 1995). 
Others predicted the failure of the policy for more objective reasons. 
• The policy tried to accomplish too many things at once (Stowsky, 1996) 
• Military requirements are too different from commercial ones (Clark, 1994).  
• The DoD and the military contractors are the wrong people making decisions 
about which technology to pursue for commercial interests (Clark, 1994) since 
they clearly have no experience in the area. 
• Commercial industry will not want to work with the DoD because of the onerous 
business requirements (Berkowitz, 1994). 
In the end the TRP was ended after only 3 years and no particular explosion of dual use 
products came to the market.  The most likely explanation for the failure of the TRP 
dual-use policies to enact any of the goals was the fact that the branches of the armed 
services were continuing dictate the types of technologies that were being developed 
(Kelley, 1997; Stowsky, 1996).  They continued to fund programs to meet their pressing 
needs as they had done previously as opposed to funding research that was more aligned 
with overall benefit of the civilian and commercial sector.  So, in some sense, the ability 
of the defense contractor to create products and services for the commercial market was 
not truly tested by this policy and disappointingly the study of this period does not yield 
a silver bullet in terms of understanding the process of defense conversion. 
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3 The Typical Defense Contractor’s Readiness 
Referring to the literature such as that discussed in the previous section, Sections 3.1 
and 3.2 will discuss the characteristics of the typical contractor that can be 
advantageous and disadvantageous for engaging in the commercial marketplace.  The 
differences between the typical operations and innovation practices of defense and 
commercial enterprises will be discussed Section 3.3.  The implications of the material 
presented in Sections 3.1 through 3.3 will be summarized in Section 3.4. 
3.1 Drivers for Defense Contractor Innovation: High 
Performance Technology and Institutional Learning 
This thesis argues that the main advantage that the defense contractor has for 
competing in the commercial marketplace is the institutional technical learning 
obtained from working on state of the art technology funded by the Department of 
Defense.  The commercial firm has had to invest it own money in research and 
development activities.  Learning has occurred, but so has spending of resources to 
obtain that learning. Likewise, the research in which the commercial firm has invested is 
not as likely to be as ambitious. 
One of the main assumptions underlying the value of the defense firm’s advantage is the 
hypothesis that being able to develop state of the art technology requires a fundamental 
understanding of the underlying physical processes of the technology.  It is proposed 
that the military contractor is more likely to have special learning in reach technologies 
and basic research than the average commercial enterprise (Alic et al., 1992). The 
associated organizational knowledge attained will provide the ability to provide superior 
performance in products and services and possible breakout technologies. 
In terms of funding activities, the Department of Defense categorizes research and 
development from the most basic research to the most applied system development on a 
scale from 1 to 7 (or alternatively 6.1-6.6 as indicated by Alic (Alic et al., 1992)) as shown 
in Table 3-1 (“DoD Financial Management Regulation 7000.14-R,” 2011).   Related to 
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this is the DoD designation of Technology Readiness Level (TRL) between 1 and 9 that 
describes how mature a technology is, which is indicated in Table 3-2.  
Table 3-1.  Department of Defense Research, Development, Test, and 
Evaluation Budget Activities4 
Budget 
Activity # 
Description 
1 (6.1) Basic Research: no specific application 
2 (6.2) Applied Research: understand the means to meet a  specific need 
3 (6.3a) Advanced Technology Development: development of subsystems and 
components; at Technology Readiness Levels of 4, 5, or 6 
4 (6.3b) Advanced Component Development and Prototypes: evaluate integrated 
technologies; completion of Technology Readiness Levels 6 and 7 
5 (6.4) System Development and Demonstration: mature system development, 
integration and demonstration 
6 (6.5) Management Support 
7 (6.6) Operational Systems Development 
 
                                                   
4 Obtained from (“DoD Financial Management Regulation 7000.14-R,” 2011) and (Alic et al., 1992). 
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Table 3-2. DoD designations of Technology Readiness Levels (TRL)5 
TRL # Criterion Example Representation 
1 
Basic principles observed and reported. 
Paper studies of a technology's 
basic properties 
2 Technology concept and/or application 
formulated. 
Analytic studies 
3 Analytical and experimental critical 
function and/or characteristic proof of 
concept. 
Components that are not yet 
integrated or representative 
4 Component and/or breadboard validation 
in laboratory environment. 
Integration of  hardware in the  
laboratory 
5 Component and/or breadboard validation 
in relevant environment. 
High fidelity laboratory 
integration of components 
6 System/subsystem model or prototype 
demonstration in a relevant environment. 
Testing of prototype in a high-
fidelity laboratory environment 
7 System prototype demonstration in an 
operational environment. 
Testing of prototype in test-bed 
8 
Actual system completed and qualified 
through test and demonstration. 
Developmental test and 
evaluation of the system in its 
intended  system  
9 Actual system proven through successful 
mission operations. 
System in the field 
 
In 2012, it is reported that the  DoD spends 12% of its budget on R&D (Klein, 2012). 
Presumably R&D is comprised of Budget Activities 1 through 7, as indicated in Table 3-1. 
Budget activities 1 through 4 are referred to as “Science and Technology” development, 
and have much more flexibility in the types of applications than more system-specific 
development as is indicated by activities 5-7 (“DoD Financial Management Regulation 
7000.14-R,” 2011). “Science and Technology” development accounts for an estimated 
16.5% of the DoD R&D budget in 2012 (AAAS, 2012).    
Activity 1 (6.1) is basic research and has the widest possible applications, and is the most 
“dual-use” almost by definition, but in terms of Technology Readiness, it is at best at the 
                                                   
5 Obtained from (“DoD 5000.2-R: Mandatory Procedures for Major Defense Acquisition Programs 
(MDAPs) and Major Automated Information System (MAIS) Acquisition Programs,” 2002) 
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lowest level.  Basic Research accounts for only  2.8% of all 2012 DoD R&D funding, and 
the vast majority of this funding is awarded to universities and government laboratories 
(AAAS, 2012).   Activity 2 (6.2) is Applied Research, which is research that involves 
performing studies in order to find a solution to a specific problem which also will be 
associated with the lower levels of Technology Readiness.  This spending consists of 
6.4% of the total DoD R&D budget in 2012 (AAAS, 2012).  Activity 3, (6.3a) is Advanced 
Technology Development, which is expected to have a TRL of between 4 and 6, 
indicating that a prototype of a component exists at least at the breadboard level.  
Activity 4 (6.3b) is called Advanced Component Development and Prototypes, which 
includes the prototype of the component being tested in the system and is required to 
have a TRL attained of 6 or 7 or demonstration that the component will work within the 
system of which it is a part.  According to the AAAS, “6.3” spending (assumed to be 
activities 3 and 4) will account for 7.3% of all R&D spending in 2012. 
Activities 5 through 7 (6.4 - 6.6) involve the development of a specific product or system.  
In the researcher’s assessment, development activities 4 through 6 are probably that 
most like the typical “product development” that is engaged in by commercial firms 
using proven technology (Ulrich & Eppinger, 2007).  It is reported that only the largest 
global companies actually invest in any basic research whatsoever.  Common wisdom 
indicates that the commercial firm will not have the incentive or ability to fund risky 
technology that is not likely to payoff in the near term (Alic et al., 1992).  Presumably, in 
terms of technical readiness, there is greater use of the highest readiness technology 
levels in Table 3-2.  Thus this type of investment is only likely to achieve incremental 
improvements.   
To grossly simplify the evaluation of the complex and variable outcomes of technology 
research and development, it is proposed that the contractor who has had the 
experience of working in 6.3 funded research activities that are at a moderate 
technology readiness could be in the best position for transferring the technology to 
commercial applications. Basic and even applied research is most likely very far away 
from any tangible product.  On the other hand, the development stages (6.4 to 6.6) of 
the system have probably already involved incorporating the specific needs and 
stringent requirements of the military application into design decisions. Also, the more 
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highly specific and developed system is also more likely to be classified or described as 
“sensitive,” which would limit the ability to distribute the technology.  The contractor 
that has the experience of taking the technology through the 6.3 stages has developed 
the technology into at least a proof of concept, but have not committed to specific 
military missions and requirements. 
Hard data on commercial firm R&D spending specifically in terms of the classification 
system in Table 3-1 are not readily available.  Also, it is difficult to determine how to 
compare the spending of DoD R&D and commercial market oriented R&D.  U.S. 
companies serving the commercial and consumer markets report that they spent more 
money on R&D in absolute terms than does the DoD by about three-fold in 2009 
(National Science Foundation, 2012). However, companies that serve the commercial 
markets are a much larger part of the economy than is the defense industry. It must also 
be noted that the degree of R&D investment as well as the type of investment varies by 
industry.  In a report on global corporate R&D it was proposed that a better metric of 
the degree of R&D investment in corporate firms is the fraction of R&D spending per 
total revenues of that company (Upbin, 2011).  In this same article, it is reported that the 
top ranked companies in R&D spending in the world were chip and pharmaceutical 
companies that can spend over 30% of their revenue on R&D; however, at the 50th 
globally ranked company was indicated to spend only 0.2% of its revenue on research 
and development.  The conclusion to be drawn is that if the DoD spends 12% of its total 
budget on R&D and a more typical company spends less than 0.2% of its revenue on 
R&D of any kind, the DoD is a much more R&D oriented organization, and the defense 
contractor that works with the DoD in this manner will have a much stronger exposure 
to R&D activities, especially the less applied ones. 
3.2 Barriers for Defense Contractors’ Move to the Commercial 
Markets 
3.2.1 Regulations and their Legacy 
Doing business with the DoD comes with onerous accounting and reporting 
requirements that increase the overhead costs for running a defense contracting 
25 
 
company. The negotiations involved in contracting to provide goods or services for the 
DoD are complex. The DoD Federal Acquisition Rules (FAR) are thousands of pages 
long not including supporting documents (“Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) Home 
Page,” n.d.)   DoD contractors are required to have a staff proficient in DoD contracting 
and accounting requirements.  Accounting and reporting for DoD companies is 
estimated to cost about 15% to 25% above that for commercial enterprises (Gansler, 
2011; Shenhar, Hougui, Dvir, Tishler, & Sharan, 1998) , adding substantially to the 
overhead in the defense contracting organizations.  Because the accounting methods are 
so different, when a single corporation has both commercial and defense markets the 
two business entities are almost always separated  (Gansler, 2011).  Although the a 
commercial business can be spun off from the originating organization as the product 
becomes mature, the development of the product up until that point may be “taxed” 
unfairly under the original organization (M. H. Meyer, 2007) and make the 
development costs seem higher than they really are. 
Another complication that comes with doing business with the DoD is that any product 
or technology that has been provided to the DoD is subject to the scrutiny of export 
controls.  All discussions of course assume that the technology in question is not subject 
to military classification.   Export of technologically advanced products that may provide 
a foreign military any advantage is regulated under the International Traffic in Arms 
Regulations (ITAR) by the U.S. Department of State and Export Administration 
Regulations (EAR) by the Department of Commerce.   The penalties for violating import 
restrictions are dire.   Penalties consist of fines of millions of dollars and the possibility 
of serving prison time (McHale, 2011). The act of providing a technology or source code 
that is subject to Export Administration Regulation to a foreign national in the United 
States is considered to be the same as exporting the technology to country of the foreign 
national (“U.S. bureau of industry and security - export control basics (exporting 101),” 
2010) . This essentially makes the free distribution of certain technology in the U.S. 
subject to export regulation.  Added to that the export regulations are extraordinarily 
complex (Calvaresi-Barr, 2006) and it is difficult for exporter to know under what 
regulating agency his  product falls.  This is also a problems with many commercial 
firms that wish to export advanced technology that hasn’t necessarily been in use by the 
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DoD.  One strategy is to obtain evaluation of the product by pro-actively contacting all 
conceivably relevant agencies.  Problems are less likely if the component or technology 
involved is not specifically involved in any militarily classified system. 
Intellectual property rights are another potential roadblock for the defense contractor 
hoping to profit from the commercial exploitation of a technology whose ownership is in 
question.  The Bayh-Dole act allows small businesses and non-profits to develop 
federally funded research and obtain patents.  This is extended to federal contractors, 
but they must pay royalties to the Federal Government.  In some instances having done 
business with the DoD precludes the ability of a firm to have any intellectual property 
rights on technology. The government can have unlimited rights to the work or a 
government purpose license allowing disclosure to 3rd parties for alternate sourcing  
(Alic et al., 1992).    
3.2.2 Culture and Practices 
Some of the potential barriers to the DoD contractor moving into the commercial 
marketplace spring from the danger of a persistent corporate culture that has come into 
being in order to best adapt to the DoD business model.    Many of the practices and 
values that are compatible with doing business with the DoD are not compatible with 
the commercial marketplace.  One area of concern is the legacy of the DoD financial 
incentives.  In the commercial market, a product is ideally produced at the lowest cost 
possible, from which the commercial seller is able to maximize profits from its sale at a 
competitive price.  However, DoD acquisition practices often involve contractual 
agreements that only allow a small percentage of profit to the DoD contractor, but allow 
essentially unlimited costs in R&D (Gansler, 2011).  This is the polar opposite of what 
constitutes good business in the commercial arena.  As a result, the DoD contractor has 
no financial incentive to invest in labor saving equipment or software or to improve in 
processes or manufacturing for greater economy in the delivery of its products and 
services.  It has been shown that defense contractors are more likely to engage in labor 
intensive processes because of the contracting arrangement makes this more profitable, 
but certainly not more cost-effective (Rogerson, 1992). The defense contractor is more 
likely to be in a state in which it has a very inefficient enterprise that is not commercially 
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competitive. Potentially worse, the defense contracting organization may have an 
ingrained culture that does not have the values and drive to make the organization 
efficient in the future.   
A cultural characteristic common in many defense contractors is how technical 
performance is highly valued.  Along with this attitude, work that is more technically 
advanced and state of the art is more respected and desirable. Best value or the tradeoffs 
between performance and price for a product or the development of efficient processes 
and manufacturing is required for a product to be commercially viable. These not valued 
or sought in this atmosphere (Alic et al., 1992).   
In a related vein, the DoD has a poor track record for bringing technology to the field 
and practice (United States Government Accountability Office, 2006).  This is thought 
to be for a number of reasons.  One possibility is that the DoD has a history of funding 
overly risky technology that has a poor chance of success to start with (White et al., 
1996).  Proper stage-gating of programs is not practiced with enough diligence and 
objectivity and programs that have a poor prognosis are not killed early enough. 
Another potential cause is the fact that there is not a formal stage in the development 
process to assess the readiness of technology to leave the laboratory and there is no 
process in place to actually transition the technology from the laboratory to 
manufacturing or production (United States Government Accountability Office, 2006).  
The DoD devotes few resources to technology transfer in general; in contrast, the U.S. 
Department of Agriculture spends as much money disseminating knowledge as it does 
doing the original research that created the knowledge (Alic et al., 1992).  
Furthermore, in contrast to commercial practice, the developers of DoD technology are 
not responsible for transferring to the technology out of the laboratory to practical 
application.  This stage is typically completed by another defense contractor (Alic et al., 
1992).  This leads to no accountability for the developers of the technology to create a 
technology that is usable and manufacturable.  Another theory about why the DoD and 
the DoD contractors have such poor outcomes with successful technology transfer is 
that DoD technology development is often classified, and complete sharing of 
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information is often not allowed, let alone encouraged.  Secrecy in is antithetical to 
diffusing technology.(Stowsky, 2004).   
The implications of the DoD and its contractors not having a good record of technology 
transfer is that defense contractors are not as likely to have experience in bringing a 
product to its final stages of development and to market.  They are less likely to choose 
technologies at the appropriate readiness levels for commercial development and they 
are less likely to have strong processes that enable an R&D development project to be 
killed once data show that the product is not likely to be viable for the current market.  
DoD contractors are not likely to have as strong competencies in process development 
and cost-effective manufacturing and distribution as their successful commercial 
counterparts. 
3.2.3 Marketing Competency 
This thesis hypothesizes that DoD contractors will have the most difficulty in the task of 
marketing commercial products or services.  One reason that this would likely be 
difficult is that in the defense acquisition process, product requirements are dictated 
from separate organizations from the supplying organization.  Or in other cases, the 
product requirements are conveyed directly in terms of specific technical terms.  For 
example, it has been the researcher’s experience that when working with U.S. Navy 
laboratories, the “customer” is often engineer or scientist with a graduate degree and 
marketing to this customer often involves another engineer or scientist with an 
advanced degree from the defense contracting organization having highly specific and 
technical conversations with this customer to determine not only what, but how the 
given work is to be done.  This is in stark contrast to many commercial customers who 
are only interested in how a product or service is going to solve his or her problems, not 
the specific technology that is used to solve a problem, as many engineers want to 
communicate.  
 In many commercial markets, a large part of successful product development is the 
producer is able to understand what the user really needs and doesn’t need (M. H. 
Meyer, 2007).  In many cases, the contractor, especially those in sub-contracting roles 
will not have a strong existing competency in need-finding and mapping technical 
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requirements to the needs of the user (Alic et al., 1992).  This would be especially acute 
in the consumer market as opposed to the industrial market because the process of 
determining needs would be so different from the established DoD requirements 
process.   
Also defense products will typically have very stringent survivability and ruggedness 
requirements.  What is important to a military customer is usually the polar opposite of 
what is important to a commercial customer. As was mentioned previously, in the 
commercial markets the correct combination of price and performance leads to success 
in the market, while in the defense market, the needs of excellent performance in harsh 
environments almost always trumps price. 
The successful defense contractor has invested in building competencies for marketing 
to the DoD that are not applicable to the commercial market.   For example, many 
resources are dedicated to DoD proposal writing, which is quite complex process with 
many regulations and content and formatting requirements. Skills in DoD proposal 
writing are an important skill for top employees in defense contracting firms. There is 
also an existing overhead structure that supports an administrative staff that specialized 
in DoD proposal writing requirements that have skills in processes that are not 
necessary for commercial proposals to industrial customers.   
Also, the defense contractor is likely to have invested in “strategic hiring” of  personnel 
that are former high ranking military officers or have had influential positions in 
defense research laboratories and contracting agencies (Bender, 2010).  This hire, very 
valuable for the defense contracting organization for building defense business, is 
typically given a high rank and salary within the contractor’s organization.  This type of 
hire will have most likely spent a career in the defense organization and be steeped in its 
culture and values.  He will also most likely wield influence within his new organization 
and encourage the values of the military organization within the contractor’s 
organization.  As was discussed earlier, these are values that are not necessarily 
compatible with commercial success.  The specific aspect of having contacts and in 
depth knowledge of the defense agencies is not especially helpful for developing 
commercial markets, though this is not to say that this type of person is in capable of 
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adapting to new needs in the future and may have good organizational and leadership 
skill in general.  
3.3 Commercial vs. Defense Product Development  
Table 3-3 lists comparisons of the commercial and military innovation and product 
development process obtained from similar tables by Alic and Shenhar (Alic et al., 1992; 
Shenhar et al., 1998).  
Table 3-3. Table summarizing main differences between product 
development in commercial and defense markets  
Factor Commercial Military 
Impetus for Design Market driven, opportunistic 
Dictated by military 
requirements 
Types of Products / 
Services 
Simple, reliable, moderate 
performance 
Complex, stringent 
requirements 
Funding for R&D Financed by company itself Government financed 
Types of R&D More applied and short term More basic and long term 
Nature of Response 
Rapid incremental change, 
punctuated by fundamental 
redesign 
Slow, large improvements 
Product Cycle Months or Years Years or Decades 
Priorities 
Process technology for low 
cost manufacturing, high 
quality  and flexibility 
Product technology for 
functional performance and 
long shelf life 
Linkage of R&D and 
production 
Integrated management of 
R&D, production and 
customer service 
R&D and production 
separately contracted  
Basis of Competition 
Competition of free market; 
overall value, price and quality 
is basis of competition 
Few competing contracting 
firms.  Often required to 
partner with competing 
contractors by DoD 
Technology sharing 
Success based on proprietary 
advantage 
Often technology sharing with 
competitors imposed by DoD 
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Table 3-4 compares the organizational and operational characteristics of the typical 
commercial and defense contractor enterprise (Alic et al., 1992; Shenhar et al., 1998). 
Table 3-4. Differences between Commercial and Defense Organizations and 
Operations 
Factor Commercial Military 
Accounting 
Reporting 
SEC, Stockholder, IRS 
Extensive Reporting to DoD in 
addition to SEC, Stockholders, and 
IRS 
Standards and 
Regulation 
Detailed Military Specifications  May be regulated, i.e. FDA, etc. 
Marketing 
Varies between  advertisement to 
non-specific customers and 
relationship based selling   
Long term relationships with few 
customers, RFP’s, government 
lobbying, hiring of ex-military for 
marketing 
Decision 
Making 
In best instances fast, and timely  
Slower timing, bureaucratic, 
following that of main customer, 
the U.S. government  
Culture and 
Values 
Business driven, practical 
engineering 
State of the art technology and 
engineering 
 
This comparison is indicative of how the defense innovates in order to meet the needs of 
the military mission and the commercial organization must innovate to meet the 
changing needs of the free market.    The commercial enterprise is required to be agile to 
meet the constantly changing needs of the market while competing with other 
companies, while the military contractor moves slowly, as does its main customer the 
federal government. These tables, though vastly oversimplified, could be a good way for 
DoD contractors benchmark their processes and priorities with the typical commercial 
firm that they may now be competing against.  
3.4 Discussion 
The evaluation of the advantages and disadvantages that the defense company for 
entering the commercial marketplace in Sections 3.1 and 3.2 do show that there are 
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many reasons for the defense contractor to be disadvantaged.  The only real advantage 
that the defense contractor can have is in terms of learning and access to state of the art 
technology, the applicability of which to the commercial markets at any particular time 
or world situation is highly variable. 
This quote from David Walker from the General Accountability Office (GAO) that is 
reproduced by Gansler (Gansler, 2011) epitomizes the common attitude towards the 
DoD’ spending and operational efficiency in much of the literature: 
DoD is number one in the world at fighting and winning armed conflicts – it’s 
an A+. But in my opinion DoD is a D (rated on a curve and given the benefit of 
the doubt) on economy, efficiency, transparency and accountability 
In one sense, the DoD contractor cannot be equated with the DoD.  One cannot expect 
an efficient, commercially competitive result when a contractor must work within a 
defense acquisition system that makes commercially competitive results impossible to 
accomplish.  It may not be the contractor’s fault that it has not developed commercially 
competitive products and services, and the fact that it hasn’t in one system is not 
indicative that it cannot in another system.  On the other hand, working in a system 
completely at odds with the free market does allow the organization partake in 
behaviors and attitudes that are also at odds with the free market and encourage a 
culture incompatible with success in  a competitive marketplace.  The skill set and 
competencies that are valuable investments for DoD contracting are not valuable 
investments for most commercial business 
It is the technical skills and knowledge in a DoD contracting firm are the most 
transferrable to the commercial marketplace, since basic physics and engineering 
practices are the same whether applied in either a military or defense context (Alic et al., 
1992).  The least transferrable skills are that of management and a staff required to 
fulfill the onerous requirements for reporting and contracting required by the 
Department of Defense. 
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4 Historical Case Studies of Successful Defense 
Conversions 
The case studies included here are those that are available and deemed most relevant to 
the focus of the study. The case studies included in this section are not directly relevant 
to the focus of this thesis on engineering services and supporting software; they are 
concerned with technologies and manufactured goods. There is no identical match of 
well documented success stories to precisely the same situation as the case study here.  
However, the historical case studies included here are relevant in other important 
aspects.  The cases of the Amana Radar Range and the Galileo Electro-Optics are 
examples of commercial success of companies that have developed a technology for a 
military use and profitably transferred it to commercial markets as spinoffs.   
There are other examples in the literature relevant to successful government and 
military conversions of research and development to civilian applications that are not 
included here because they are not as relevant to the base case for a number of reasons. 
For example, NASTRAN is a success story for the government agency NASA’s 
development of general finite element software in the 1960’s that is the origin of many 
existing commercial software available today (Alic et al., 1992). The case study in 
Section 6 is concerned with development of software; however, the story of NASTRAN’s 
government conversion is not as relevant as other stories are.   NASTRAN’s transition to 
the commercial market originates from the government’s decision to release the source 
code to the public domain, and the ability of commercial enterprises, including McNeal-
Schwindler to capitalize on it. The government contractor that had a part in developing 
NASTRAN, Computer Sciences Corporation did not convert the product and did not 
profit from the conversion(“Finite Element Analysis Resources: A Brief Review of 
NASTRAN Versions,” 2010).    
4.1 The Raytheon and the Microwave Oven 
Percy Spencer, a developer of radar system technology at Raytheon is credited with 
being the inventor of the microwave oven in 1945.   The key technological component 
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of both the radar systems and the microwave oven is based on the magnetron, a 
device designed to emit microwaves.  Presumably, the development of the 
magnetron device would fall under a DoD “6.3” research activity or “Budget Type 3 
or 4” activity as classified in Table 3-1.   
According to the popular mythology, Spencer noticed that a chocolate bar in his 
pocket had melted after he had been standing near an operational magnetron, with 
which he had been working (“Inventor of the Week: Percy L. Spencer,” 1996).  From 
this observation, work was begun to apply the magnetron device to cooking food, 
developing eventually what was known as the “Amana Radar-Range” or now more 
commonly known “microwave oven.”  The oven was first marketed to commercial 
customers, as it was initially a very large and bulky device.  It took about 20 years for 
the oven to be developed to a point in which it was compact and affordable enough to 
be suitable for the commercial market.   
The following factors are thought to be significant in the success of the venture (Alic 
et al., 1992):   
• Percy Spencer, the inventor of the magnetron central to the microwave oven 
was personally involved in the development of the Radar-Range product 
• The CEO of Raytheon took a special interest in the project, which may have 
something to do with the fact that Raytheon had just had faced budget cuts 
after the end of World War II that threatened the health of their business. 
• Raytheon first marketed the product to industrial customers, who would value 
what it could do for them enough to pay an initially high price. 
• Raytheon corporate interest in investing in the further development of the 
device persisted in spite of a slow development process bringing it to the 
commercial market (20 years).  
• Raytheon had acquired the company Amana for another reason, but Amana 
had experience in commercial marketing that Raytheon did not themselves 
possess.  
 
4.2 Galileo Electro-Optics / NetOptix Corp.  
Shenhar offers the example of Galileo Electro-Optics as an example of a company that 
was eventually able to successfully transition its defense applied technology to the 
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commercial markets (Shenhar et al., 1998).  Galileo, based in Sturbridge, Massachusetts 
at the time, produced optical devices used for remote sensing, night vision devices and 
other applications for the defense market.  These were devices, components of other 
systems, so the technology development in this area would be classified a DoD “6.3” 
research activity or “Budget Type 3 or 4” activity as classified in Table 3-1.   
In the 1980’s Galileo took the approach of keeping the same basic technology base and 
the same technical personnel, but looked for new markets and applications of their 
technology.  It found the applications in office products and medical products.  Later 
events indicate that Galileo moved into fiber-optic technology and was enormously 
successful; Corning acquired Galileo after it was newly named NetOptix for $2.1 billion 
in 2000 (Howe, 2000). 
To summarize, the following points are important in understanding the success of 
Galileo (Shenhar et al., 1998) : 
• Galileo had tried multiple times to leave the defense market, suggesting that the 
company was not satisfied being a defense contractor and was very motivated to 
change. 
• Galileo kept the same the same technical personnel when it adapted its core 
technology for other applications. 
• The company ended up having to lay-off 50% of its workforce, so the transition 
was not painless. 
Allowing some speculation, another important point in this story could be that a little 
luck and a changing market and eco-system made their technology more valuable to 
other industries. They were able to offer the right technology at the right time for their 
transition, and move into a growing market. 
4.3 Discussion 
The small sample of brief case studies has some common threads with the case study in 
Section 6. These companies had a high motivation to expand away from the defense 
contracting.  Raytheon had just experienced a massive downturn in federal funding after 
the end of World War II.  No doubt due in part to that fact, the CEO of Raytheon at the 
time was an ardent supporter of the project.  The fact that Galileo had tried a number of 
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times to leave the defense market indicates that management was strongly motivated to 
change their business. In both cases the core technical personnel and expertise were 
used in the development work required to adapt the existing technology to the new 
applications.   
It is also worth noting that both ventures were not immediately successful.  Galileo had 
to lose half of its workforce before its new markets started to take off and Raytheon’s 
road to the large scale sale of microwave ovens took over 20 years. 
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5 Strategies for Entering New Markets 
There are internal and external challenges for any business moving to a new market.  
The internal challenges that are specific to defense contractors due to the legacy of DoD 
business practices were discussed in Section 3.2.  This section will address interaction 
with the general market, and draw from prescriptive literature including that aimed at 
general industry. 
5.1 Adjacent Markets 
Entering a new market is a way for any company to grow, but it is also a way to risk 
losing invested money and damaging the original business by diverting resources away 
from it, and even hurt the reputation of the company.  Many authors that write about 
corporate growth blame the failure of new corporate ventures on the failure of 
companies to carefully choose their new ventures to be closely adjacent to their core 
businesses. The farther away a company ventures away from its core business and 
competencies the higher the risk of failure (Zook, 2004).  In the best case, an adjacency 
can actually improve the strength of the original core business. 
5.1.1 Assessing Adjacency and Core Competencies 
A company’s core businesses are driven by its core competencies. A successful 
company’s core competencies are the specific skills and knowledge from which a 
company is able to provide the products and services that its customers value and are 
willing to purchase at a price that provides a profitable business for that company.  The 
core competencies maintain a business’s competitive advantages over its rivals in the 
marketplace.  Some examples of core competencies are General Electric’s “human 
resources” and “learning culture” or Proctor & Gamble’s  “innovation” and “customer 
understanding” (Takaoka, 2011).   
An adjacency is new ways of doing business that expands on the existing market or 
business model in which the company currently engages. Zook classifies the types of 
adjacency moves into 6 types (Zook, 2004): 
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1. Product 
2. Geographic 
3. Value Chain 
4. Channel 
5. Customer 
6. New Business 
“Product adjacencies” consist of selling new products to existing core customers.  This is 
considered to be the adjacency with the least risk and the biggest payoff. In the military 
contractor context this would involve selling a new product to the U.S. military.  This 
type of adjacency is probably a viable strategy for DoD contractors and has no doubt 
been used before.  However, given shrinking defense budgets of today, the option of 
selling a new product to the DoD is probably not as viable during these times, hence the 
subject of this thesis.   
“Geographic adjacencies” are pursued by selling the same product to a new geographical 
area.  Zook opines that the difficulty successfully executing this adjacency is often 
underestimated, since it can involve cultural and supply chain difficulties, especially in 
international markets.  The military contractor pursuing foreign military sales would be 
pursuing a geographic adjacency. 
“Value chain adjacencies” involve adding products and services up and/or down the 
value chain. An example of this would be a distributor of consumer products opening up 
its own retail stores, which is a difficult expansion, since it involves very different 
activities than those that have been learned during the commission of the original 
business activity. 
“Channel adjacencies” involve selling products and services through a new channel.  For 
example, Amazon selling its Kindle e-readers in retail stores such as Walmart versus 
solely through amazon.com is a channel adjacency.  This seems to be most relevant to 
the consumer product and service realm. Channel adjacencies, given the rigid 
acquisition process of the DoD and government does not seem like a valid option for the 
DoD contractor. 
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“Customer adjacencies” involve changing an existing successful product to adapt it to a 
new customer segment.  This is the adjacency strategy that is most consistent with the 
concept of a defense contractor moving into commercial markets, although defense 
products are very rarely unmodified for the civilian market (Mowery, 2010). 
“New business adjacencies” are created when a new business is built around an internal 
tool or competency that was originally developed to support the original business. 
Amazon selling its cloud based platform that was developed to run its e-commerce site 
as a service for other businesses to run their sites on is an example of this.  
5.1.2 Adjacency for Military Contractors 
The major core competence that can be advantageous for the defense contractor is the 
ability to develop state of the art technology, as is discussed in Section 3.1.  For a defense 
contractor, many of its core competencies, which enables it to engage in business with 
the DoD, as were discussed in part in Section 3.2, are not valuable in the context of the 
commercial markets. 
As was discussed in the previous section, certain adjacencies are less relevant to the 
military contractor.  Shenhar et al. has created a framework relevant to Zook’s 
“customer adjacency” distance from the core business that is specialized for the military 
contractor.  Shenhar has created a scale of market and customer types that indicates the 
degree of difference of a customer type from the original military customer.  The most 
similar customer to the military customer is a para-military organization such as a 
police force or other U.S. government agencies, the moderately different customer is the 
industrial customer, and the least similar customer is the consumer.   Also, a scale to the 
degree of change required in the product is proposed starting from the smallest change 
consisting of from a modified product, to a moderate change consisting of a product 
based on the same base technology to the greatest change consisting of a completely new 
technology.   The possibility of a completely unmodified military product being sold to 
any market besides the defense market is not considered.     The dimensions of customer 
and market type and change in product are combined to create a risk matrix as is 
indicated in Figure 5-1 (Shenhar et al., 1998).  
40 
 
 
Figure 5-1. Shenhar (1996) Product-market risk matrix for defense 
conversion6 
The use of this matrix in Figure 5-1 provides a sense of the distance from the core 
business for each adjacency move.  This risk matrix provides the lowest risk for business 
activity of the military contractor selling a slightly modified product to a Para-military 
or government customer, which amounts to an adjacency very close to the core at a very 
low risk.   The very farthest business from the core business and highest risk adjacency 
would consist of having the same staff develop a new technology for the consumer 
market.   
In the case of the microwave oven case study discussed in Section 4.1, the adaption of 
the radar magnetron for microwave cooking would be classified as “same technology, 
different products” under Shenhar’s scale of product similarity.  Initially 
Raytheon/Amana sold this product to the Industrial Market, and created a venture that 
would be classified as “High Risk” under the risk matrix in Figure 5-1.  If they had 
                                                   
6 Figure 5-1. Shenhar (1996) Product-market risk matrix for defense conversion is adapted from Figure 1 
in Shenhar (Shenhar et al., 1998) 
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chosen the consumer market initially, it would have been classified as “Very High Risk,” 
and very unadvisable. Galileo Electro-Optics , described in Section 4.2, also moved to 
industrial customers, and in this case would be classified under “Moderate Risk” or 
“High Risk” depending on the degree to which it needed to modify its products, with 
either “modified products” or “same technology, different products.” 
5.2 Partnering Decisions 
Shenhar et al. also discusses the strategy of partnering with other companies that are in 
the new market to which the defense contractor is moving. This work recommends that 
the higher the risk of the adjacency the more a partnership should be considered 
(Shenhar et al., 1998).  Andrew and Sirken exhort any company hoping to expand its 
business by creating new products to explicitly consider all of the options available to 
market them because beyond just ensuring viability of the new product, choices in 
commercialization can dictate the profitability of the product in the years to come 
(Andrew & Sirkin, 2003).  Their nomenclature describing the commercialization options 
are: 
• Integrators (sole ownership): complete development including manufacturing 
and marketing 
• Orchestrators (outsourcing, partnership, joint venture): contribute in only some 
of the steps required to take a new product to market and use one or more 
partners 
• Licensors: license the technology  
 
Developing the new product or service completely in house (integrating) will require the 
greatest risk and investment.  This option is only viable if the company has the product 
design, manufacturing process and technical talent that is necessary. Andrew and Sirken 
state that most organizations do not appreciate the degree of investment and time 
required for this option, even though it may seem like the safest route with the most 
control.  These authors recommend this option in the cases in which the time to market 
is not important, when the market needs remain stable, and when the new product is 
using proven technology.  
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Partnering (orchestrating) reduces the risk and investment. But on the other hand, 
entering into a partnership also requires the skills of being able to collaborate with as 
many partners as necessary and to be able to make decisions quickly.  The project 
management competency requirements in a multi-organizational project are high. The 
corporate culture has to be compatible with giving up some control. Partnering is 
recommended when there is a mature supplier and partner base, the market for the 
product is very competitive and the technology is not completely mature. 
Licensing is another option that should be considered. This is a low risk and low 
investment option.  However, it requires that the firm has the ability to manage 
intellectual property and the ability to perform the basic research that goes along with 
patentable technology.  This is recommended when the innovation has very strong 
intellectual property protection, the market is immature and risky, and the innovating 
company does not care to build its brand. 
Given the hypothesized lack of marketing competencies and inexperience in doing 
business in the commercial market in general, this framework for partnering decisions 
would point towards the defense contractor finding at least one partner. Most military 
contractors are experienced with either partnering, contracting, or subcontracting with 
other military contractors, including their own competition because of the nature of 
military acquisition (Alic et al., 1992) .  Project management skills have been developed 
in this atmosphere to enable effective multi-organizational project management. In 
other cases, licensing may also be a good option for the defense contractor, provided 
they have good intellectual property management skills. 
5.3 Changing and Innovating within Corporate Organizations 
Meyer and Poza document a case study in which Raytheon was able to adapt their 
defense sensor system technology and market it to the U.S. Department of Homeland 
Security (M. Meyer & Poza, 2009).  The Department of Homeland Security is a U.S. 
governmental agency. The case on which this work is based, differs from the type of 
defense conversion that is of the most interest for this thesis, the case in which an 
existing military technology or knowledge is adapted to a commercial market.  However, 
from Raytheon’s point of view, this was a new customer, with different needs and 
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attitudes from the DoD customer to which they were accustomed.  This case study is 
also interesting because it also explores the process of innovating within the corporate 
environment.  It is especially relevant because it is an example of defense conversion 
within the corporate environment of a defense contractor. 
Meyer and Poza take Raytheon’s experience as a reference point about which to 
generalize about the characteristics of good defense conversion candidates and the 
business practices that will increase the likelihood of success for the conversion.  These 
authors propose that it is first important ensure that the candidate market is growing, a 
market for which the company has a well defined products, and is closely adjacent to 
their core business. Corporate support and commitment to fund the venture for some 
prescribed period of time even in the face of initial failures is also required.  A team 
must be formed to execute the new project and must contain team-members that have 
an internal record of creating growth in the original core business.  These authors also 
specify that the team members must be willing to work closely with some of the new 
customers to fully understand what they need, what their new customers’ operating 
constraints are, and how and in which channels they prefer to purchase the products or 
services.  The team must acquire an understanding of the full “eco-system” in which the 
new market resides and the implications of this eco-system on the company’s business 
model.  
The authors Roberts and Fusfield discuss team-member roles that are desirable for 
effective teams for innovative activities within a corporate organization (Roberts & 
Fusfield, 2002). These roles are: 
• Idea Generating: learning and synthesizing ideas about markets, technologies, 
and new approaches and procedures 
• Entrepreneuring or Championing: pushing and demonstrating the value of the 
new ideas, especially to management 
• Project Leading: planning and coordinating the new effort 
• Gate-keeping: collecting and dispersing information about important 
developments inside and outside of the organization 
• Sponsoring or Coaching: protecting and advocating for the new effort outside of 
the team 
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These are not formal roles, and more than one role can be played by a single person, or a 
single role can be played by multiple people over the lifetime of the project. 
5.4 Conclusions 
This section has touched on some of the factors that concern any company entering a 
new market: evaluating the market relative to company capabilities, evaluating the best 
partnering choices, and building teams and policy structures within the corporation to 
execute the project of entering the new market.  In particular the defense contractor 
entering a new commercial market has characteristics that narrow the options 
somewhat. Moving into the consumer market as the first step is very high risk for 
military contractor according to the analysis set forth by Shenhar et al.  Assuming that 
the military contractor does not have good competencies in marketing and 
understanding commercial markets, the framework Andrew and Sirken would 
recommend the defense contractor either partner with a company more experienced in 
the new market or even consider licensing if its intellectual property is strong. Finally, as 
is the case for any type of organization, the internal corporate structure must be in 
alignment with the new venture, and provide a framework under which the venture can 
succeed. 
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6 Case Study: Combat Ship to Oil Platform Survivability 
This section will look at a case study in which there is an ongoing effort in a medium size 
company to commercialize software and expertise developed for combat ship 
survivability for the application to offshore oil rig safety and survivability. 
Note that the name of the companies, company divisions and other specific titles and 
names involved have been changed in order to protect the identities and confidentiality 
of the entities involved.   
6.1 Background  
6.1.1 Overall Organizational Background 
6.1.1.1 Organizational Structure 
The parent company, MID-SIZED7 Science and Technology is primarily a professional 
services provider with the U.S. Department of Defense making up 90% of its business  
(“MID-SIZED Science and Technology,  Hoover’s Company Records - In - Depth 
Records.,” 2011). The parent company consists of approximately 3000 employees in 
total at over 40 major offices in the U.S. with smaller satellite offices both in the U.S. 
and worldwide (“Company Website: MID-SIZED Science and Technology,” 2012).  This 
is a matrix organization that is split into 2 major strategic business units or “sectors.”  
Each of these sectors is comprised of 3 “groups.”  This portion of the organization chart 
is shown in Figure 6-1.  The business activity that will be discussed in this case study 
occurs within the arbitrarily named Sector 28 and Group 2.2.  The support organizations 
are also indicated at each level in the hierarchy shown in Figure 6-1.  At the corporate 
level (referred to as level 0) there are organizations devoted to legal services and 
strategic initiatives, and marketing is not indicated in the Figure 6-1 is an organization 
that resides under the Chief Administration Officer (CAO).  At the sector level (level 1) 
there is a Business Development organization and a Chief Technical Officer (CTO). 
                                                   
7 MID-SIZED is a pseudonym  for the actual company name, which is being withheld to preserve 
confidentiality 
8 The business divisions are also disguised here. 
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Figure 6-1. Highest levels of organization of studied business and 
engineering activities9  
A total of 5 tiers or levels exist in the parent company. The activity that is discussed here 
originated within an arbitrarily named Division 2 (level 4 in the hierarchy) that is within 
an arbitrarily named Operation 2 (level 3) within Group 2.2 (level 2) as is indicated in 
Figure 6-2. In summary, the division manager that this business development effort is 
centered upon is 4 levels away from the corporate organization and is competing with a 
large number of competing organizations within the various levels. 
                                                   
9 Disguised data obtained from (“Company Website: MID-SIZED Science and Technology,” 2012)  The 
bold lines indicate the flow to the areas in which the new business development studied took place in the 
hierarchy. 
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Figure 6-2. Partial organization chart indicating the Division 2 in which the 
business development activity originated within the company9. 
 
6.1.1.2 Organizational History and Current State 
MID-SIZED was founded 10 years ago in 2002 and consists mainly of 15 acquisitions of 
other defense contractors and consulting companies.  One of these acquisitions is NAV-
ARCH10.  NAV-ARCH is a provider of Naval Architecture, Marine Engineering and 
Program Management support.  NAV-ARCH was acquired 8 years ago by MID-SIZED, 
but has existed as a functioning business entity for 48 years before the acquisition  
(“Company Website: MID-SIZED Science and Technology,” 2012).  It is worth noting 
that given this history of acquisitions and its short life as an organization; the parent 
company MID-SIZED does not have a single entrenched corporate culture throughout; 
however each acquisition in many cases, including NAV-ARCH, has its own culture and 
way of doing things.  Figure 6-3 shows a partial organization chart starting with Group 
2.2, the organization in which the studied engineering and business activities occurred 
                                                   
10 NAV-ARCH is a pseudonym of the acquired company used for the purpose of confidentiality. 
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that indicates the partitioning of separate operations consisting of employees from 2 
different acquisitions: Acquisition A (NAV-ARCH) and Acquisition B, another 
engineering services company with some overlapping competencies.  Figure 6-2 
indicates the rest of the organization chart below “Group 2.2” including the location of 
the division from which the business development that is studied here originated.  
The main expertise and customer base of Operations 1 and 2, originating from the NAV-
ARCH acquisition is the design and engineering of surface ships.  Operation 2 was 
dependent on contracts from the U.S. Navy for the development of new surface ships.  A 
very large portion of this work disappeared when the recent plans to develop the next 
generation cruiser, CG(X) were cancelled in 2010 (“Draft Shipbuilding Report Reveals 
Navy Is Killing CG(X) Cruiser Program,” 2009).  No other programs of comparable size 
replaced it or were foreseen to replace it (Fabey, 2012).  This operation had moved to 
providing services to international military customers, but an overall downturn in the 
global economy made these business opportunities much rarer.  These factors resulted 
in a poor prognosis for the operation’s financial viability.   
 
 
Figure 6-3. Partial organizational chart indicating the composition of 
previous acquisitions  
6.1.1.3 Existing Marketing Approach 
The marketing approach of MID-SIZED has a high dependency on face to face meetings 
with current or prospective customers as well as responding to requests for proposals 
Operation 3Operation 2Operation1
Group 2.2
Business 
Development
Level 2
Level 3
Acquisition A Acquisition B
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and included work with international military customers.  It is common in the defense 
sector as well as in many commercial engineering services to have “strategic hires” that 
have previous employment at key customers’ organizations (Culbert, 2011). In the case 
of MID-SIZED this constituted a number of personnel that were former U.S. Navy 
officers or were employed within Navy research laboratories that were charged with 
business development as a major work activity. 
But also, like many similar companies in engineering services and involved  in science 
and technology development, MID-SIZED, does utilize the technical staff in its business 
development, since they are closest to the customer and best understand their 
technically complex needs, as is expressed in the MID-SIZED Form 10K: 
Our technical staff is an integral part of our promotional efforts. The customer 
relationships they develop through their work often lead to additional business 
and new research opportunities (MID-SIZED Science and Technology 
Corporation, 2011). 
6.2 The Catalyzing Event: Deepwater Horizon Disaster 
On April 20, 2010 there was a devastating explosion on the Deepwater Horizon oil rig in 
the Gulf of Mexico that attracted world-wide attention and put the offshore drilling 
industry’s operations and safety practices under the spotlight (Birknes, 2010; 
Freudenburg & Gramling, 2011; Graham et al., 2011; Konrad & Shroder, 2011) .  As the 
images of the aftermath of this disaster in Figure 6-4 and Figure 6-5 connote, this 
disaster had a very negative effect on world-wide public opinion about offshore oil 
drilling, led to a moratorium on drilling in the Gulf of Mexico and was in many ways 
very bad news for the offshore oil drilling industry as a whole. 
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Figure 6-4. Coast Guard Photograph of Deepwater Horizon Fire11  
 
Figure 6-5. NOAA veterinarian examining oil-covered sea turtle in the Gulf 
of Mexico12 
Much of the news coverage about the Deepwater Horizon Disaster concentrated on the 
environmental impact to the Gulf Coast area and the managerial and corporate culture 
that allowed priorities for safety to be sacrificed for the sake of budget and schedule.  
What were talked about less were the events that immediately followed the blowout.  
Shortly after the driller reported that the well blew out, explosive gas from the well had 
                                                   
11 Credit: U.S. Coast Guard; Source: 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:Deepwater_Horizon_offshore_drilling_unit_on_fire_2010.jpg, 
downloaded on 3/28/2012 
12 Credit: NOAA/GADNR; Source: 
http://www.nmfs.noaa.gov/pr/images/oilspill/kempsridleyturtle_brianstacy_noaa_gadnr.jpg, 
downloaded on 3/28/2012 
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moved up through the drill pipe and collected on the rig deck.  Two explosions followed.  
Apparently these explosions caused devastating structural damage which in turn injured 
and trapped personnel, prevented the crew from manning emergency stations and 
destroyed emergency backup systems and power generation (Birknes & et al, 2010; 
Transocean, 2011). No doubt the explosions had some part in taking the lives of the 11 
missing crew-men and made controlling the rig and fighting the fire difficult. 
In the best of situations, offshore drilling is extraordinarily dangerous as these statistics 
from the Report from the Presidential Commission on the Deepwater Horizon Disaster 
cites:  
Drilling for oil had always been hard, dirty, dangerous work, combining heavy 
machinery and volatile hydrocarbons extracted at high pressures. Since 2001, 
the Gulf of Mexico workforce—35,000 people, working on 90 big drilling rigs 
and 3,500 production platforms—had suffered 1,550 injuries, 60 deaths, and 
948 fires and explosions.(Graham et al., 2011)  
Aside from falls and mishaps with machinery, an ever present danger is the risk of fires 
and explosions on the offshore drilling rig.  The worst tragedy on an offshore oil rig in 
history involved the Piper Alpha explosion and fire in 1988 in the North Sea that killed 
167 men (Konrad, 2011).  
Some of the media coverage related to this incident included information about the 
impressive technology comprising the dynamically positioned drillships such as the 
Deepwater Horizon.  It was the fact a drillship is essentially similar in many of its 
primary functions to a surface ship that prompted a division manager within Operation 
2 within MID-SIZED (formerly of NAV-ARCH) to speculate if skills and knowledge that 
he knew that his organization used for surface ship analysis and design for the U.S. Navy 
could be applied to some of the problems highlighted by the Deepwater Horizon 
disaster, most notably their combat ship survivability design and analysis expertise. 
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6.2.1 The Existing Product and Related Expertise 
Division 2 within operation 2 specialized in the evaluation of and design for surface ship 
survivability.  Survivability in the context of a combat surface ship is described 
according to regulations in the DoD 5000.2-R as: 
AP3.2.4.  Survivability.   The capability of a system and crew to avoid or 
withstand a man-made hostile environment without suffering an abortive 
impairment of its ability to accomplish its designated mission.   Survivability 
consists of susceptibility, vulnerability, and recoverability.  (“DoD 5000.2-R: 
Mandatory Procedures for Major Defense Acquisition Programs (MDAPs) and 
Major Automated Information System (MAIS) Acquisition Programs,” 2002) 
Susceptibility in the context of a naval surface ship refers to the how easily a system (or 
ship) is discovered (via infrared signatures, etc.) and therefore is open to attack.  MID-
SIZED interpreted susceptibility to be related to the design features of the rig that may 
be the cause of a hazardous event (“Offshore Oil Industry Marketing Assessment – 
Foreign and Domestic Targets and Strategy,” 2010).  (Given the accounts of the 
Deepwater Horizon Disaster, susceptibility could also be described in terms of 
management practices, economic factors and human behavior.)  Vulnerability refers to 
the how well a system is able to withstand an attack and continue to function.  
Recoverability is defined as the ability of a system after sustaining damage in the attack 
to take emergency actions to prevent the loss of the system and minimize loss of 
personnel (“DoD 5000.2-R: Mandatory Procedures for Major Defense Acquisition 
Programs (MDAPs) and Major Automated Information System (MAIS) Acquisition 
Programs,” 2002).   
Associated with this expertise was a software package that was developed and continued 
to be developed by personnel within the organization, dubbed SYS-SURV13 that was 
primarily used and continually improved and developed for combat ship survivability 
prediction and design, although it had been used for buildings in a few instances.  This 
software offered root-cause failure determination, structural and network analysis and 
                                                   
13 SYS-SURV is a fictitious name for the software package 
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the integration of vulnerability and recoverability evaluations of system designs.  Also 
more specific to the combat ship and potentially offshore oil-rigs,  it provides fire and 
flooding simulations and ballistic and fragment damage predictions (“Company 
Website: MID-SIZED Science and Technology,” 2012).  It made use of first order physics 
and empirical data and Monte Carlo simulation to provide probabilistic predictions.  A 
major advantage of this software package was that it integrated many different types of 
analyses into a single package. 
The software was developed and continued to be developed as company proprietary 
since the company had a strategy of pursuing international military sales in the initial 
face of  the declining U.S. defense budgetary allocation to surface ship development 
(“Tool Development for the International Naval Market,” 2009). 
6.2.2 Summary 
The following background factors contributed to the inception of the transfer of naval 
combat ship survivability software and knowledge to commercial deepwater drilling 
applications: 
• Drilling rigs are very similar to combat ships in many ways in terms of their 
structure and function and supporting systems including safety systems 
• There is an ever present risk of fires and explosions from the gases associated 
with petroleum drilling  
• A horrific incident on the Deepwater Horizon highlights the danger of explosions 
and fire and the highlights the inadequacy of current survivability designs. 
• The organization had a very technically advanced product and a special expertise 
in combat ship survivability that was pertinent to the explosion and fire 
survivability of marine structures. 
• The fact that U.S. Navy surface ship design services are not in demand in the 
current political and economic environment for an organization that depends on 
this business is a strong motivation for change and new business development. 
• Business development is encouraged and expected from all levels of the 
organization hierarchy. 
 
 
54 
 
6.3 What Happened: Moving the Product and Expertise to a New 
Market 
6.3.1 Internal Inquiry and Initial Market Research 
In April 2010, around the time of the Deepwater Horizon event was heavily covered in 
the news, the aforementioned interested division manager had a number of 
conversations with various people within the organization about the concept of using an 
internally developed software package for oil rig survivability analysis or other 
capabilities  Serendipitously, one of the employees in the MID-SIZED / NAV-ARCH 
organization had a personal and professional acquaintance who was currently working 
for an offshore drilling contractor based in Norway.  This employee then contacted his 
acquaintance working in the offshore drilling industry. The Norwegian offshore drilling 
engineer expressed great interest in the possibility of improving survivability and safety 
analyses for offshore rigs (“Platform Survivability Assessments for the Offshore Oil 
Industry: Marketing Assessment,” 2010).  Having such immediate access to precisely 
this sort of contact was very fortunate.   The offshore drilling contracting industry is in 
fact a central part of the offshore drilling industry and has the most direct interest in 
survivability design and assessment, since these companies design and lease the drill-
ships.  Transocean, a prominent member of the offshore drilling contracting industry 
was at the center of the Deepwater Horizon incident and faces multiple lawsuits because 
of the disaster off of the Gulf Coast (Lubin, 2011). 
Even though it was not evident at the time, the fact that this offshore drilling contact 
was associated with an organization based in Norway was also very opportune because 
of the level of concern that the Deepwater Horizon disaster caused the Norwegian 
people and government.  Independently, and after the fact, the researcher used  Google 
Trends (“Google Trends,” 2012) to monitor the relative interest in the search term 
“Deepwater Horizon” in different geographical areas.  The results of this indicate the 
surprising result that Norway had the greatest relative interest in this search term as is 
indicated in Figure 6-6.  The data are normalized to all of the traffic originating from a 
particular country that visits the Google search site.  Figure 6-7 is a plot of breakdown of 
this data by individual city that shows that New Orleans, Houston, and Washington DC 
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are performing the most Google searches on “Deepwater Horizon” relative to their total 
traffic level.  This is compatible with the predicted degree of impact that this event had 
on these regions.  The fourth ranked city for interest in “Deepwater Horizon” indicated 
in Figure 6-7 is Oslo, Norway, which would indicate special interest in this subject in 
Norway as well.  Further investigation about the current state of Norway shows that this 
interest most likely coincides with the fact that a massive oil spill in the North Sea could 
be potentially devastating to Norway and its economy.  Fishing in the North Sea is an 
important part of the Norwegian economy.  The petroleum sector is controlled by the 
Norwegian government and this industry makes a substantial contribution to funding 
its socialist economy (“CIA - The World Factbook: Norway,” 2012).  Publications 
originating from the Norwegian oil industry interests also reflect a deep concern about 
the deepwater horizon incident and a commitment to safety regulation and mention in 
particular precisely the same sorts of engineering assessments for safety that the tool 
that MID-SIZED would provide (Birknes, 2010; Haug et al., 2010).     
Other personnel proactively contacted other stakeholders and potential customers 
including Transocean and BP Oil, in which interest was expressed, but not to the degree 
apparently of the Norwegian contacts.   Apparently the US offshore industry contacts 
were not prepared to act in the near future, presumably in part because they were  in the 
shadow of the legal problems that  were ongoing with the Deepwater Horizon incident 
(“Platform Survivability Assessments for the Offshore Oil Industry: Marketing 
Assessment,” 2010). 
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i 
Figure 6-6. Geographical Information for increased density of the search 
term worldwide obtained from Google Search Trend14 
 
Figure 6-7. Google search trend density by city worldwide14 
                                                   
14 Data obtained from Google Trends of search term “Deepwater Horizon” (“Google Trends,” 2012) 
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6.3.2 Upper Management Briefings and Market Research 
In the beginning August 2010, a briefing advocating pursuing the offshore oil industry 
survivability market was made to MID-SIZED upper management.  This included a 
prediction of the likely impact that the Deepwater Horizon incident would have on the 
offshore industry including an anticipated renewed commitment to safety and accident 
prevention.  The impact on regulations and engineering best practices resulting from the 
Exxon Valdez oil spill was used as a point of reference.  The briefing provided an 
assessment of the market size and the MID-SIZED capabilities that would be relevant in 
this market. Next steps consisting in part of a pilot study on an actual oil rig was 
proposed along with other marketing investigations and  (“Platform Survivability 
Assessments for the Offshore Oil Industry: Marketing Assessment,” 2010).  The 
presentation was well received at the CEO level and resources were provided to continue 
the effort. 
In the middle of September 2010, a follow-up briefing was presented to MID-SIZED 
upper management.  This briefing discussed the specific contacts and marketing 
messages made.  This presentation made more specific estimates about the timing and 
costs involved for the previously proposed pilot study, which was felt to be required for 
successful marketing efforts. 
Discussions with various stakeholders in the offshore oil rig industry were continued 
over time, including oil industry regulators in the US and Norway. 
6.3.3 Pilot Study and Continued Marketing 
In the middle of August 2011 a pilot study was initiated with a Norwegian offshore 
drilling company mentioned previously to perform an analysis using the modified SYS-
SURV tool of an existing offshore rig owned by the Norwegian drilling company 
(“DEEPSEA ______ Integrated Barrier Analysis Pilot Study - Lessons Learned Report,” 
2011)15 .   The study was a complex modeling effort.  The modelers in fact visited the 
actual rig in the North Sea to assess the as-built configuration of the rig and to fully 
understand the very complex structure. The main challenge, besides the complexity of 
                                                   
15 The author and precise title of this referenced internal memorandum is omitted to preserve anonymity 
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the system, was the difference between terminology used by the offshore oil rig industry 
and that by the naval surface ship community that the modelers used.  The results of the 
problems uncovered by the SYS-SURV tool were then compared to that obtained by 
existing tools that were used for the original design of the rig.  The SYS-SURV tool was 
deemed to have superior performance because it uncovered a super-set of hazards 
identified by the original analyses.  The fact that multiple analysis types were included 
in a single tool was seen as an advantage because it could save substantial time.   
At the time of this writing the adapted SYS-SURV tool is being marketed to the offshore 
oil rig industry.  The value proposition that is offered is that it offers superior accuracy 
and savings in time and money because it integrates several analyses that would 
normally need to be done separately.  It is worth noting that in term of the time from the 
original idea of offering an initial product to the market is about 2 years.   
6.4 Organizational Study 
The literature studies discussed in Sections 2 through 5 suggest that there are certain 
factors that will increase the likelihood for success for a market expansion effort.   
Analysis of the system in which the defense contractor must work when doing business 
would also suggest certain institutional barriers would also exist.  Aside from obtaining 
volunteered information about the history of the venture, some specific questions about 
the venture were posed16: 
• What was management commitment? 
• What was the team composition for the initial venture? Specifically did it include 
those who had developed the original technology? 
• What were the challenges in your marketing and market research? 
• How significant were the following specific issues and how did you deal with 
them? 
o Export Restrictions 
o Intellectual Property 
o Industrial Culture and Communication 
o Overhead Costs 
                                                   
16 A single respondent was available to answer the questions: the “Division Manager” that played as 
central role in this story (“Communication with MID-SIZED Division Manager: March 13, 2012,” 2012).   
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This section will present the answers to these questions and discuss the background 
research that prompted the question. 
6.4.1 Management Interest and Commitment 
The respondent indicated that enthusiastic management interest and approval went all 
the way up to the CEO level since the first briefing to corporate in the summer of 2010.   
This is congruent with successful corporate ventures described in the literature as was 
discussed in Sections 4 and 5. Alic posited that in the case of development of the 
microwave oven this was a major factor for success (Alic et al., 1992).  Meyer and Poza 
also stated their belief that corporate championing is an important factor for success 
and played an important role in Raytheon’s successful move to the homeland security 
industry (M. Meyer & Poza, 2009). 
6.4.2  Team Composition 
Senior personnel including experts in marine survivability and related areas were 
involved in the market research, which consisted on numerous interviews and contacts.  
The main architect of the software package SYS-SURV was also involved with the 
venture.  A small team was formed for a pilot study to develop a benchmark model for 
an actual oil rig included experienced users of the original software.  
 Alic stated that the fact that the originator of the original base technology was heavily 
involved microwave oven application was an important part of the success (Alic et al., 
1992).  This is consistent with the theory of the great importance of tacit knowledge in 
technology transfer. 
6.4.3 Marketing and Research 
The respondent admitted that it was a very fortunate that initial contacts included 
Norwegian offshore oil industry.  U.S. partners were much less willing to commit to any 
clear path because of the wake of the Deepwater Horizon legal issues.  Continued 
investigation indicated how favorable the Norwegian market was. However, they 
continue to pursue US based offshore drilling industry. 
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Although it was not explicitly stated, it goes without saying that this marketing was 
difficult, but it was expected.  The actions of the involved team members show 
considerable effort was invested over almost two years to get to the point at which they 
feel that they are ready to begin offering a product to the market.   
6.4.4 Barriers 
Export Regulations 
Because of its long time experience in the defense industry, including the providing 
engineering services to foreign militaries, MID-SIZED was accustomed to carefully 
navigating export regulations and had the necessary licenses and approval.  This was not 
the problem that one might anticipate based on the literature describing the complexity 
of export regulations that was described in Section 3.2. 
Intellectual Property 
MID-SIZED had a policy of maintaining intellectual property rights on all of their 
software.  The development of the software was funded internally, and so there was no 
question about intellectual property rights.  This apparently was not a significant barrier 
in this case as was speculated in Section 3.2 but indicates that the policy of maintaining 
intellectual property could pay off. However, in some instances, maintaining intellectual 
property in the form of patents can be quite costly and complicate contract negotiations 
for DoD business (Intellectual Property: Navigating Through Commercial Waters, 
2001). 
Industrial Culture and Communication 
The main barrier was really the vocabulary and terminology used by two different 
industries.  The fact that the company was a defense contractor was not the reason that 
this problem existed.  This would be a problem for any cross-industry collaboration. 
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Overhead 
Misplaced overhead was not perceived to be a significant factor in this instance. It was 
hypothesized that because the defense contractor’s overhead is spent on services such as 
accounting and reporting that are not valuable to the commercial venture, that the 
development work would look like it was more expensive than it really was, as was 
discussed in Section 3.2.  
6.5 Discussion 
The market adjacency location in Shenhar’s scale Figure 5-1 is a “Modified Product for 
an Industrial market” categorizing it as a “Moderate Risk venture.”  MID-SIZED found 
partnering with an established player in the industry invaluable.  The venture was able 
to obtain enthusiastic corporate support and had the cooperation of experts in the 
technology and knowledge base in which they were working. 
Unforeseen events and a little luck played an important part of the successes of this 
venture to date.  Ironically, the fact that US based offshore companies were so affected 
by the Deepwater Horizon disaster made them hesitant to commit to partnering or 
switching tools.  Fortunately, they had the luck to begin their marketing inquiry in the 
especially receptive Norwegian offshore industry. 
Certain policies and experience made some of the expected DoD industry barriers to be 
less of a problem.  They were careful to maintain intellectual property rights on all of 
their commercial software, so there was no question about the ownership of the 
technology.   
The due diligence in investing the time and money to perform a pilot study on a real oil 
rig structure using tool provides an important proof for marketing.  The effort in market 
research and learning about the industry over time as well as being careful to have 
conversations with regulators was no doubt also an important part of their success to 
date. 
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7 Conclusions 
7.1 Evaluating the Thesis Statements 
Four hypotheses were posed in this thesis.  This section will evaluate the accuracy and 
level of support for each of them in this work.  
7.1.1 Hypothesis 1: Legacy of DoD Business Processes and Culture 
The internal organizational management and culture 
borne of the incentives of the defense marketplace are 
obstacles to the defense contractors’ commercial success. 
The literature is unequivocal in reporting that the incentives for the DoD contractor are 
often at complete odds with the free market.  DoD contractors’ core competencies such 
as negotiating DoD contracts, fulfilling DoD accounting and reporting requirements, 
and possessing marketing intelligence and personal relationships for DoD customers 
have no value for commercial business.  It was proposed that sustaining the peculiar 
needs of the DoD customer would be a burden for an enterprise that had no need for 
them.  
However, the defense contractor queried about his experience in pursuing a commercial 
market in Section 6 was not particularly discouraged by these barriers.  Problems 
associated with export controls and intellectual property were not a problem because 
the organization had pro-actively dealt with these potential problems by a policy and 
experience in complying with these regulations. He believed that overhead “taxes” were 
a “secondary or tertiary” effect. 
7.1.2 Hypothesis 2: Commercial Marketing Especially Difficult  
Marketing to the commercial customer will be very 
challenging for the defense contractor. 
Marketing to any new customer is difficult for any business. In terms of the engineering 
services industry, the barriers for entry are very high, no matter who is trying to enter 
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the new area (Culbert, 2011).  In relationship based businesses, including much of the 
defense business this requires a great deal of time and energy and face to face 
interactions with potential customers. In fact, the team pursuing the offshore market 
seemed quite willing to reach out to many different stakeholders in the offshore 
industry.   
Relationship based business marketing may play into the experience and competencies 
of the defense contractor.  However, consumer marketing is completely different, and 
Shenhar et al. discourages this move for the defense contractor (Shenhar et al., 1998).   
An off-hand comment by the source used for this study indicates that the problems in 
marketing might spring from the fact that engineers are not effective at communicating 
the benefits of a product to their customer and tend to emphasize the features and 
techniques used, in which the customer is much less interested. 
7.1.3 Hypothesis 3: DoD Sponsored Learning 
The defense contractor is the beneficiary of 
organizational learning obtained from the experience of 
performing research and development on advanced 
areas that would not be funded in the commercial realm.   
Certainly the DoD funds things that would never be funded by commercial firms. 
However, it is also in question how valuable the learning is for application to the 
commercial market.  This is a highly variable factor. 
The case study described in Section 6 did indicate a developed expertise in marine 
survivability was obtained from extensive work in combat ship survivability as well as 
having the benefit of validation data for their modeling tools.   
7.1.4 Hypothesis 4: DoD Learning as a Competitive Advantage 
The defense contractor’s learning derived from defense 
R&D experience can be turned into a competitive 
advantage in some cases. 
64 
 
There is ample evidence that defense R&D has had enormous impact on the commercial 
markets.  It is important to note that often the benefit of the commercial activity spurred 
by defense funded learning has not necessarily been conferred on the original developer 
of the technology for the DoD.  However, in certain instances, such as the case studies 
mentioned in Section 4, and potentially the case study in Section 6, this is the case. 
7.2 Preliminary Recommendations 
The literature does yield some common recommendations for any company hoping to 
enter a new market.  Analyzing this literature in conjunction with the documented DoD 
system and associated characteristics of the DoD contractor does provide a set of 
recommendations that are most relevant to the DoD contractor that wants to profitably 
convert defense technology. 
7.2.1 Choosing Technology 
Aside from the most important consideration of how competitive and appropriate the 
technology or component is for the market, “6.3” funding could be a good place to look 
initially for candidate technologies or components. The descriptions of R&D funding 
indicating the degree of specialization and technology readiness suggests that “6.3” 
funded technology may have the best balance of generality and technology readiness for 
non-military applications as was discussed in Section 3.1.  Component level, technology 
that is part of a larger system may be also a good candidate. Other factors to consider 
are the sensitivity and classification level that of the systems with which the technology 
is associated, in terms of likely problems with “sensitivity” and being subject to export 
controls.   
7.2.2 Choosing Markets 
As was discussed in Section 5, consumer markets are the most challenging markets for 
the defense contractor and the Shenhar framework illustrated in Figure 5-1 or other 
market adjacency frameworks should be considered to ensure the market is similar 
enough minimize risk. Meyer and Poza also suggest that a new market should be a 
growing market (M. Meyer & Poza, 2009). 
65 
 
7.2.3 Forming Teams 
In terms of corporate venturing, it is a common recommendation that there is an 
enthusiastic champion of the venture and that the upper management makes it clear 
that they support the venture (Alic et al., 1992; M. Meyer & Poza, 2009).  
It is also recommended that for complex technologies, at least some of the key personnel 
involved in developing the technology or products in the original context are included in 
the new development project; they have tacit knowledge that will likely be indispensible 
(Alic et al., 1992). 
7.2.4 Organizational and Cultural Factors 
It is clear that many of the practices that are appropriate for working with a DoD 
customer are antithetical to the free market (Gansler, 2011).  Old assumptions need to 
be questioned as much as possible to combat the tendencies to do things in the way one 
is accustomed with the DoD customer. 
7.2.5 Marketing Approach 
In any case, marketing is very difficult for new players in an industry and careful 
research and understanding of the market and the systems that influence it are essential 
(M. Meyer & Poza, 2009).  It is probably good advice for any new player to devote 
special resources and time understanding the new market.  Partnering with an existing 
player in the target industry should be seriously considered (Shenhar et al., 1998). 
7.3  Future Work 
As was mentioned in the discussion about the scope of this in Section 1, the true scope of 
defense conversion is an enormous one.  The case study and main concern of this thesis 
represents a very small subset of all of the possible technologies and company types that 
are part of the defense industry and have potentially transferrable technologies or 
knowledge.  In this study, defense conversion was limited to U.S. defense agencies and 
U.S. companies. Defense conversion in different countries with potentially different 
economies and societies may also be worth studying. 
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Certain recommendations, such as “6.3” type funded projects may provide the best mix 
of technological maturity and generality for defense conversion have no empirical proof.  
Conceivably this could be studied in a more systematic and empirical fashion via patent 
data and other publically available information. Also other specific characteristics of the 
technology and company types such as the target industry or the armed service branch 
that was originally served by the technology could be correlated to the rates of successful 
conversion. 
Other efforts that are associated with defense conversion efforts such as the SBIR 
program could also be studied with perhaps more insight than the brief study of the 
Clinton TRP program yielded.  
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